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Summary 
The following thesis “Conflicting Peacekeepers: The Applicability of International 
Humanitarian Law to the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo” intends to direct 
attention to the problems caused by the increased legitimization of use of force through 
peacekeeping mandates. The core of the thesis answers whether peacekeepers can, once 
authorized to take up arms, be bound by international humanitarian law (IHL), and whether they 
can be held accountable for grave breaches thereof. The case study of the MONUSCO 
peacekeeping-mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) offers valuable ground 
for consideration of the two formerly distinct concepts of peacekeeping and the laws of armed 
conflict.  
As an instrument deployed by the United Nations Security Council (SC), peacekeeping plays an 
important role in the maintenance of international peace and security. Traditionally characterized 
by impartiality, consensual deployment, and abstention from the use of force, peacekeeping had 
been considered far from colliding with the obligation to comply with IHL. Throughout the last 
two decades, however, the SC has increasingly authorized peacekeeping-operations (PKOs) with 
stronger mandates, legitimizing missions to resort to force beyond the necessity for self-defence 
and the protection of their mandates. 
In 2013, the United Nations Security Council established the Intervention Brigade under the 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), 
mandated to fight alongside the Congolese government in neutralizing armed rebel groups. The 
Intervention Brigade is a well-equipped military-force, about 3,000 military-personnel strong, 
directly placed under the command of the MONUSCO mission. This force is unique insofar as it 
enjoys “explicit authorization to use force against parties to the conflict”, an unprecedented 
characteristic to peacekeeping.  
The following thesis thus outlines that the Intervention Brigade’s role in the DRC qualifies it as a 
party to the ongoing war, and consequently binds it by the rules governing this non-international 
armed conflict, at least for the time and duration its peacekeepers exercise the role of combatants. 
Furthermore, the thesis addresses that the UN acknowledges that their peacekeepers, once 
actively engaged the conflict, must abide by the rules regulating the respective hostilities. 
However, persisting immunities and privileges provided for by the 1994 Convention on the 
Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel allow to question the equal applicability of 
laws of war to peacekeepers. Further, the narrow scope of necessary observance of IHL provided 
for by the 1999 Secretary General’s Bulletin causes uncertainty for which period of time 
peacekeepers enjoy a protected status as civilians, and from which moment on they can be 
considered as combatants in a conflict.  In acknowledging the importance to enforce respect for  
IHL, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has held accountable perpetrators and compensated 
victims to grave violations of the Geneva Conventions (GC) that were committed in the context 
with the Congolese conflict.  However, though part of the MONUSCO-contingent is bound by 
IHL, it appears that their prosecution for grave breaches depends on their national courts’ 
willingness and ability to cooperate in prosecutions of their personnel and to condemn 
international crimes. 
  
The increased authorization of the resort to force through peacekeeping mandates triggers a valid 
discussion regarding the relationship between a new “aggressive” generation of peacekeeping and 
the traditional laws of war. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Peacekeeping has emerged as a core instrument of the international community to safeguard and 
restore peace and security, and to shield humanity from the atrocities of warfare. Branded with 
impartiality, consent, and abstention from the use of force1, the peacekeepers are seen as the 
protectors of victims of armed conflicts, and harbinger of transition to sustainable peace. Charged 
with these tasks, the international community long understood the importance of peacekeepers’ 
safety and protection as integral to the successful exercise of peacekeeping missions. Over the 
last two decades, however, certain peacekeeping-operations (PKOs) have undergone changes in 
terms of the legal basis of mandates. Increasingly authorized under Chapter VII of the United 
Nations Charter (UNC), the United Nations Security Council (SC) has legitimized several 
missions to resort to force, beyond the mere necessity for self-defence and the protection of the 
safe execution of their mandates. This new generation of peacekeeping is often referred to as 
“robust” peacekeeping.2  
Indeed, with the establishment of the Intervention Brigade under the UN Organization 
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in 2013, the UN 
has taken peacekeeping to another level. The Intervention Brigade, a well-equipped military-
force, with 3,000 personnel contributed from South Africa, Malawi and Tanzania3, is placed 
under the direct command of the MONUSCO mission.4 The SC has authorized this military 
contingent to deploy offensive use of force in support of the Congolese government in the 
ongoing domestic conflict. Such fundamental development under a PKO allows for substantial 
consideration regarding the compatibility of such practice with the traditional features of 
peacekeeping, as well as with the applicability of the laws of war to peace-operation. More 
specifically, the authorization of MONUSCO’s military contingent to directly engage in 
hostilities gives considerable ground for contemplation whether, under what circumstances, and 
to what extent, peacekeepers can be bound by IHL and whether peacekeepers could be 
prosecuted for grave breaches thereof.  
Witnessing a trend in increased legitimized force, the essence of this thesis aims at drawing 
attention to the controversies and problems caused by the authorized use of force under 
peacekeeping mandates, and discusses whether the laws of force allows for an equal application 
and enforcement in situations when peacekeepers have been authorized to deploy offensive force. 
                                                     
1
Magdalena Pacholska, “(Il)Legality of Killing Peacekeepers: The Crime of Attacking Peacekeepers in the 
Jurisprudence of International Criminal Tribunals.” Journal of International Criminal Justice. Vol. 13, No. 1 (March 
1, 2015). pp. 67–68.  
2
 The Brahimi report defines “robust peacekeeping” as a form of PKOs with more clarity on the operation’s authority 
to use force, equipped with more extensive military capabilities and resources to fulfill a deterrent function. Such 
mandates are intended for peacekeeping in complex environments where the effective deterrence from potential 
threat is necessary for the effective execution of a mission. In United Nations General Assembly and United Nations 
Security Council, “Identical Letters Dated 21 August 2000 from the Secretary-General to the President of the 
General Assemly and the President of the Security Council (Brahimi Report).” August 21, 2000, p. x. 
3
 Peter Fabricius, “Africa: Is the Force Intervention Brigade Still Justifying Its Existence?”, Institute for Security 
Studies (Tshwane/Pretoria). June 22, 2017, http://allafrica.com/stories/201706220262.html. Accessed May 14, 2018. 
4 “MONUSCO Background”, United Nations Peacekeeping, February 19, 2016, 
https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/background.  Accessed May 10, 2018. 
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Essentially, this thesis attempts to answers the following research question: Can peacekeepers of 
the Intervention Brigade in the MONUSCO mission be bound by international 
humanitarian law (IHL), and can they be held accountable for grave breaches thereof? To 
adequately address this question, it is essential for the thesis to clarify several sub-issues, namely  
i. which rules of IHL are applicable and enforced with regard to the conflict in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),  
ii. under what circumstances and to what extent UN peacekeepers can be bound by IHL,  
iii. whether this is the case for the peacekeepers of the Intervention Brigade in the DRC  
iv. and whether such peacekeepers can be held accountable for grave breaches of IHL. 
In order to adequately answer these questions, the thesis will be structured in five main parts. 
Part 1 of this thesis defines peacekeeping, highlighting its main purpose and tasks, as well as the 
current classification of peacekeepers under international law. Furthermore, attention will be 
directed to the changing nature of peacekeeping mandates and the increasing number of missions 
authorized under Chapter VII of the UNC. Most prominently reflecting the development from 
traditional to robust peacekeeping, the MONUSCO mission in the DRC will serve as an example. 
The Intervention Brigade, MONUSCO’s offensive military force, is an example where 
peacekeepers have been authorized to become actively engaged in a conflict, which differentiates 
it from prior missions. Sources used in this first part are documents by the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), SC Resolutions establishing respective PKO mandates, 
international law, customary law and case law essential for defining the legal status of 
peacekeepers, as well as academic scholarship.   
Part 2 of the thesis draws upon the applicability of the Geneva Conventions (GCs) in both, IACs 
and NIACs and to whom the deriving obligations are binding upon. It is established to which 
degree the laws of war apply and how they are enforced in the ongoing conflict in the DRC. 
Sources used are the GCs, relevant data on the conflict in the DRC, documents on the presence of 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the DRC, and academic scholarship. 
Part 3 of the thesis outlines whether and to what extent UN peacekeepers and, subsequently, 
members in the Intervention Brigade are bound by IHL. Sources used in this second part of the 
thesis are the GCs and their Additional Protocols (APs), UN documents relevant to the 
applicability of IHL to UN-forces, SC Resolution outlining the MONUSCO mandate, reports on 
military operations in the DRC, as well as academic scholarship. 
Part 4 of this thesis addresses whether MONUSCO peacekeepers can be held accountable for 
grave breaches of IHL. Outlining the relevance of International Criminal Law to the 
enforceability of and compliance with IHL, it will be assessed whether it is practically possible 
for peacekeepers of the Intervention Brigade to be prosecuted for international crimes.  Obstacles 
as deriving from the special legal framework of peacekeeping will be analysed, such as 
immunities of the 1994 UN Convention, and the exclusive jurisdiction of troop-contributing 
countries, and the complementary nature of the ICC. 
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Part 5 of this thesis offers a short insight into state opinion on the eventual future development in 
favour or against the authorization of robust peacekeeping mandates. Sources used in this part of 
the thesis are Member States’ diplomatic statements and scholarly opinion and research. 
Scope 
This thesis focuses primarily on military-contingents of PKOs authorized by the UN. The case 
study of MONUSCO has been chosen as the Intervention Brigade under MONUSCO is the first 
UN-force authorized to deploy offensive force under a peacekeeping-mandate and is therefore the 
most likely to engage in combat activity in an armed conflict – an area regulated by IHL. 
Throughout the text, the terms, “the laws of war”, and “the law of armed conflict” are used 
interchangeably.  
1. DEFINING PEACEKEEPING 
Ever since PKOs were launched, the complexity and controversy of their legal status under 
international law has puzzled scholars and practitioners. As an instrument deployed by the SC to 
exercise its duty to maintain international peace and security5, PKOs have become an important 
subsidiary organ of the UN.6 With mandates tailored to the needs of each respective host-country, 
the main task of peacekeeping is to monitor the successful transition from conflict to peace.7 The 
authorization of traditional peacekeeper-mandates has been based on the so-called Chapter VI ½ 
of the UNC, neither fully belonging to the instruments of pacific settlements of disputes under 
Chapter VI8 nor, when deployed in volatile environments, to mechanisms in response to threats or 
breaches of international peace and security under Chapter VII.9 As of today, 14 active PKOs are 
deployed by the UN in ongoing- and post-conflict zones around the world.10  
As the concept of peacekeeping did not exist when the UNC was drawn up, the Charter itself 
does not provide for a precise definition. Similarly, the GCs, concerned with the regulation of 
hostilities in warfare (ius in bello), do not address the peacekeeping concept.11 Indeed, prior 
peacekeeping-practice falls far outside the scope of ius in bello, as it is characterized by three 
distinct features, namely (1) the warring parties’ consent for their deployment, (2) impartiality, 
and (3) the non-use of force, except for self- and mandate-defence. 12  Currently, the UN 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) defines peacekeeping as  
a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been 
halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the 
                                                     
5
 Scott Sheeran et.al., “The Intervention Brigade: Legal Issues for the UN in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” 
International Peace Institute (2014), p. 3. 
6
 Ibid., p .4. 
7
 “United Nations Peacekeeping.” United Nations Peacekeeping. Available at https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/node. 
Accessed May 11, 2018. 
8
 Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945), Chapter VI. 
9
 “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines.” United Nations Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (2010), pp. 13–14.; Ibid., Chapter VII. 
10
 “Principles and Guidelines”, ibid. 
11
 Katharina Grenfell, “Perspective on the Applicability and Application of International Humanitarian Law: The UN 
Context”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 95, No. 891/892 (2013), p. 648; Sheeran et.al., “The 
Intervention Brigade,” supra note 5, p. 3. 
12
 Conflict Barometer 2017. Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (Heidelberg, 2018), p. 23. 
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years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing cease-fires 
and the separation of forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex mode of many 
elements – military, police and civilian – working together to help lay the foundations for 
sustainable peace.
13
 
The DPKO’s definition of PKOs rightly captures the growing interdisciplinarity of missions, 
which is reflected in the diversity of personnel, comprising police, civilian, and military 
contingents.14 The focus of this thesis, however, remains on military contingents of peacekeeping 
missions, as they are the most likely to become bound by IHL, and whose legal status will in 
more detail be outlined subsequently. 
1.1. The Legal Status of Peacekeepers 
Military-peacekeepers are characterized by three regimes. Namely, they are members of the 
armed forces of their troop-contributing countries (TCC)15, further, they qualify for immunities as 
UN personnel, and lastly, they enjoy the status of protected persons under IHL.  
Firstly, the functioning of the UN peacekeeping-system heavily relies on the cooperation and 
willingness from TCCs to make available their troops.16 The legal framework for such troop-
deployments is defined by bilateral agreements, the Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) 
and Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), between each respective TCC, the UN, and the host 
state of deployment. 17  MoUs and SOFAs define practical and legal obligations of such 
cooperation. Crucially, both MoUs and SOFAs outline that TCCs reserve exclusive jurisdiction 
over their troops, with respect to “any crimes or offences that might be committed by them while 
they are assigned to the military component of a [UN PKO] [emphasis added].”18 It follows that 
military peacekeepers, as opposed to civilian personnel may only be prosecuted before their 
national criminal and military tribunals, as they do not lose the attribution to their armed forces of 
their sending states.  
Secondly, although peacekeeping was not considered at the time the UNC was drafted, it has 
been established retrospectively that peacekeepers qualify for the immunities and privileges of 
the organization, provided for in Art 105(2) UNC. 19  Subsequently, peacekeepers qualify for 
“privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions” when 
serving the UN.20 Additionally, and most relevant for peacekeeping, the Convention on the Safety 
                                                     
13
 “Principles and Guidelines”, supra note 9, p. 18. 
14
 Pacholska, “(Il)Legality of Killing Peacekeepers", supra note 1, p. 67. 
15
 Neha Jain, “A Separate Law for Peacekeepers: The Clash between the Security Council and the International 
Criminal Court.” The European Journal of International Law. Vol. 16, No. 2 (2005), p. 245 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 “Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations [Participating State] Contributing Resources to [the 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operation]”, United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations. Available at 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/MOU_with_TCCs.pdf. Accessed February 14, 2018.; Report of the 
Secretary General, “Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peace-Keeping Operations in All Their 
Aspects: Model Status-of-Forces Agreement for Peace-Keeping Operations”, United Nations General Assembly 
(1990). 
18
 “Memorandum of Understanding”, ibid., Art. 7.22. 
19
 Charter of the United Nations, supra note 8, Art. 105(2). 
20
 Ibid., Art. 105(2). 
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of United Nations and Associated Personnel in 1994 (1994 Convention)21, allocates immunities to 
“members of military, police, or civilian components of a [UN] operation.”22  Further, it reads that 
specific privileges and immunities must be concluded between the UN and the host-country of a 
respective PKO23, which is done through Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs). Essentially, in a 
SOFA the host-countries accept the peacekeepers privileges and immunities 24  as PKOs are 
subsidiary organs to the UN, and thus permanently immune from the prosecution for any act 
performed during the official capacity.25 Furthermore, the SOFA distinguishes between civilian 
and military personnel. Civilian peacekeepers may be forwarded to criminal proceedings in the 
host country, while military members are subjected to TCCs’ exclusive jurisdiction “in respect to 
any criminal offence […] committed […] in the host country”26.  These provisions are relevant in 
the fourth part of the thesis, addressing accountability of peacekeepers for grave violations of 
IHL. Indeed, the 1994 Convention was drafted in response to re-occurring attacks on 
peacekeepers in the 1990s, and thus concerns itself with the protection of the personnel in the 
first place, condemning their direct targeting as illegal. 27  Interestingly, the Convention’s 
definition of “United Nations operation” explicitly limits its protective scope, privileges, and 
immunities to peacekeeping-mandates that have not become involved inter-state war, as it 
excludes “personnel […] engaged as combatants against organized armed forces and to which the 
law of international armed conflict applies [emphasis added]” 28. This notion that is especially 
relevant in the further analysis of applicability of IHL to peacekeepers in the third part of this 
thesis.  
Thirdly, peacekeepers qualify as protected persons under IHL and International Criminal Law. 
Most notably, such protection is engraved in the Customary IHL Rule 3329 and the statutes of 
international criminal tribunals that criminalize the direct killing of peacekeepers.30 Accordingly, 
the Rome Statute was the first multilateral treaty to label the direct targeting of humanitarian or 
peacekeeping personnel a war crimes under its Art. 8(2)(e)(iii).31 The Special Court of Sierra 
Leone (SCSL) was the first international tribunal to hold a perpetrator criminally liable under this 
war crime in the landmark case Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon, Augustine Gbao 
(RUF Trial, 2009). In its reasoning, the Court underlined that the crime to target a peacekeeper 
corresponds with the traditional fundamental prohibition of IHL to attack the civilian population, 
identifying it as a mere “particularisation” of a rule already deeply engraved in customary 
                                                     
21
 “Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel”, 1994. Preamble. 
22
 Ibid., Art. 1 (a)(i). 
23
 Ibid., Art. 4. 
24
 “Model Status-of-Forces Agreement”, supra note 17, Art. 3. 
25
 Ibid., Art. 46. 
26
 Ibid., Art. 47(b). 
27
 1994 Convention, supra note 21, Art. 15. 
28
 Ibid., Art. 2 (2). 
29
 Customary IHL Rules 33 reads  as follows: “Directing an attack against personnel and objects involved in a 
peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the 
protection given to civilians and civilian objects under international humanitarian law, is prohibited.” In “Customary 
IHL - Rule 33. Personnel and Objects Involved in a Peacekeeping Mission”, available at https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule33. Accessed March 16, 2018, 
30
 “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court”, 1999. Available on http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/romefra.htm. 
Accessed February 14, 2019. Art. 8(2)(e)(iii); “Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone” 2000. Available on 
https://doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004152342.i-873.9. Accessed April 18, 2018. Art. 4. 
31
 Rome Statute, ibid., Art. 8(2)(e)(iii). 
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international law (CIL), rather than the establishment of a  new crime.32 A year later, in 2010, the 
ICC reaffirmed this classification in Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda (2010), condemning a 
Sudanese national for war crimes under the Statute’s Art. 8(2)(e)(iii) for intentionally attacking 
peacekeeping-personnel and objects.33 Throughout the judgement, the Court reaffirmed that 
peacekeeping personnel, installations, materials, units and vehicles involved in a 
peacekeeping mission established in accordance with the [UNC] [are] entitled to the 
protection given to civilians and civilian objects under [IHL].
34
 
Both cases manifest that military-peacekeepers are considered protected persons under 
international law, and that it is in the interest of their TCCs and the international community to 
shield them from becoming directly targeted during armed conflicts. It follows that peacekeepers 
are entitled to civilian protection under customary IHL, though only insofar as they do not engage 
in hostilities as combatants, which would consequently deprive them of such protected status. 
Furthermore, the 1994 Convention’s privileges apply for as long as peacekeepers do not engage 
in hostilities governed by the laws of international armed conflicts (IACs). However, accounting 
for the development of mandates, the compatibility of this current legal framework with a revised 
and more robust generation of peacekeeping, has ground to be questioned, as subsequently 
outlined on the example of MONUSCO. 
1.2. The Changing Nature of Peacekeeping  
Since the 1990s, peacekeeping has undergone a rapid development in terms of growing numbers 
of PKO deployments and a complexity from robust mandates.35 Missions have been deployed in 
situations of persisting violence, and not, as previously outlined in the definition provided by the 
DPKO, merely in situations where “fighting has been halted”36. Indeed, the fact that the SC has 
increasingly chosen UNC Chapter VII as the legal basis for mandates implies the existence of a 
“threat to peace”37 and the need to adequately equip PKOs for the exercise of duties in volatile 
environments. In light of an emergence of increasingly robust missions the 1999 Secretary-
General’s Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian 
Law (1999 Bulletin) acknowledged the possibility that peacekeepers, when acting under the 
authorization of force or self-defence, can in situations of armed conflict become “actively 
engaged therein as combatants”38. It follows that such development has increasingly legitimized 
peacekeepers’ resort to military activities in conflicts, which in turn might qualify them as 
                                                     
32
 Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon, Augustine Gbao (RUF Trial), Case No. SCSL-04-15-T (Special 
Court for Sierra Leone), March 2, 2009. 
33
 Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda (Abu Garda), Case No. ICC-02/05-02/09 (International Criminal Court), 
February 8, 2010. 
34
 Ibid., p. 27, §60. 
35
 Scott Sheeran, “UN Peacekeeping and The Model Status of Forces Agreement”, United Nations Peacekeeping 
Law Reform Project (School of Law University of Essex, August 26, 2010), p. 5; RUF Trial, supra note 5. 
36
 “Principles and Guidelines”, supra note 9, p. 15, 19. 
37
 Jaume Saura, “Lawful Peacekeeping: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations,” Hastings Law Journal Vol. 58 (2007-2006), p. 502. 
38
 “Secretary-General’s Bulletin: Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law (1999 
Bulletin)”, August 6, 1999. Art. 2(2); Tristan Ferraro, “The Applicability and Application of International 
Humanitarian Law to Multinational Forces”, International Review of the Red Cross, Multinational Operations and 
the Law, 95, No. 891/892 (2013), pp. 580-581. 
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combatants, legitimate targets, and eventually even as a party to a conflict.39 This transition was 
witnessed most prominently on the UN PKO in the DRC. 
1.2.1. The Example of MONUSCO 
The prime example for the development of PKOs is the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), whose current mandate fundamentally 
differs  from the traditional characteristics of peacekeeping, namely (1) consent, (2) impartiality, 
and (3) abstention from use of force . 40  The UN’s involvement in the DRC as well as the 
background of the ongoing domestic conflict is long-lasting and complex.41 Initially, the presence 
of peacekeepers in the DRC began under the UN Organization mission in the DRC (MONUC) in 
1999, whose mandate gradually expanded from observational tasks to including the supervision 
of ceasefire agreements, the support to humanitarian and human rights work, the protection of the 
civilian population, and the supervision of the electoral process in 2006. 42  As a milestone 
development in peacekeeping, MONUC became the first PKO to be authorized under Chapter 
VII of the UNC, charged with the protection of civilians as the mission’s number-one priority, 
which legitimized resort to force whenever seen necessary for the protection of the population.43 
In 2010, the SC Resolution 1925 (2010)44 succeeded MONUC by establishing the MONUSCO 
mandate45, which was essentially charged with stabilization and peace consolidation46 and with 
effective protection of civilians from violence of the conflict47 by “all necessary means”48, which 
implied the resort to force when the execution of tasks was under threat.  
Three years later, in 2013, and as a response to persisting violence in the DRC, threatening the 
stability of the country and the Great Lakes region, the MONUSCO mission was furnished with 
the so-called Intervention Brigade, established by SC Resolution 2028(2013).49 The Brigade is an 
offensive military force, placed under the Force Commander of MONUSCO, and comprises three 
infantry battalions, one artillery, as well as one special force. 50  Its establishment was seen 
necessary and appropriate, in light of the previous mandate’s failure to protect the civilian 
population from large-scale human rights violations perpetrated by rebel groups.51 Consequently, 
the Secretary General’s proposal to create a force of such strength was adopted unanimously by 
the SC.52 It follows that since Resolution 2028(2013), the MONUSCO mission is furnished with 
                                                     
39
Ferraro, ibid., p. 562. 
40
 Pacholska, “(Il)Legality of Killing Peacekeepers", supra note 1, pp. 67–68. 
41
 “MONUSCO Background”, supra note 4. 
42
 Ibid. 
43
 Patrick Cammeart, “The UN Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, International Peace 
Institute (July 2013), p. 2. 
44
 “Resolution 1925 (2010)”, United Nations Security Council, May 28, 2010. 
45
 Whittle, “Peacekeeping in Conflict: The Intervention Brigade, Monusco, and the Application of International 
Humanitarian Law to United Nations Forces”, Georgetown Journal of International Law 46 (2015 2014), pp. 843-
844. 
46
 Resolution 1925 (2010), supra note 44, Art. 12(l-t). 
47
 Ibid., Art. 12(a-k). 
48
 Ibid., Art.11. 
49
 “Resolution 2098 (2013)”, United Nations Security Council, March 28, 2013; Conflict Barometer 2017, supra note 
12, p. 24. 
50
 “MONUSCO Background”, supra note 4. 
51
 Cammeart, “The UN Intervention Brigade”, supra note 43, p. 2. 
52
 Ibid. 
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the following tasks: Firstly, MONUSCO was charged under Art. 12(a)(i) with the protection of 
civilians from threat of physical violence from any party to the conflict53, which includes the 
cooperation to eradicate violations of human rights and IHL, such as from conflict-related sexual 
violence.54 Secondly, and as a distinguished feature of the mission, the Resolution authorizes the 
Intervention Brigade to deploy offensive military force for the “[n]eutralization of armed groups 
[…] [i]n support of the authorities of the DRC [emphasis added].”55 The Resolution underlines 
further that such use of forced may be deployed unilaterally or in cooperation with the DRC’s 
armed forces, the Forces Armées de la Republique Democratique du Congo (FARDC), but 
requires it to be exercised “in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner and in strict 
compliance with international law, including international humanitarian law [emphasis 
added].”56 Thirdly, MONUSCO is mandated to assist in bringing perpetrators of international 
crimes to justice, i.e. war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the DRC, by 
cooperating with the Congolese government, regional states and the ICC.57 Thus, the obligations 
of MONSUCO can be summarized as the protection to the civilian population in the fight against 
HR and IHL violations, the neutralization of armed groups through offensive force exercised by 
the Intervention Brigade, and the assistance of the international criminal justice system to ensure 
enforcement and compliance of IHL.  
The Intervention Brigade distinguishes itself from other PKOs insofar as it enjoys “explicit 
authorization to use force against parties to the conflict”58, an unprecedented characteristic to 
peacekeeping. Indeed, the creation of the Intervention Brigade allows to question MONUSCO’s 
character as a traditional PKO insofar as it essentially contradicts the three distinct features of 
peacekeeping: non-use of force (unless for self- and mandate-defence), impartiality, and consent. 
Indeed, Resolution 2028(2013) authorized parts of the mission’s personnel to “neutralize” 
organized armed forces59, with infantry battalions, artillery and a special force at their disposal60, 
it fundamentally contradicts the traditional characteristic to abstain thereof, unless for the purpose 
of self-defence.61 Furthermore, the Intervention Brigade’s support to the FARDC in the fight 
against rebel groups fundamentally contradicts previous PKOs’ features of impartiality and 
consensual deployment.62 Additionally, the assistance to the Congolese government has shaken 
the credibility of the UN, as the FARDC has been accused of several IHL and HR violations.63  
The mandate of MONUSCO, and with it the Intervention Brigade, has been renewed annually 
without substantial modification.64 The latest renewal of Resolution 2409 (2018) in March 2018 
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extends the authorization to exercise this robust mandate for another year. 65  As of 2018, 
MONUSCO is the largest PKO deployed by the UN, and comprises a total of 16,215 military 
personnel, out of which 3,000 peacekeepers are assigned to the Intervention Brigade, whose 
TCCs are Tanzania, Malawi and South Africa.66 Even though the UN repeatedly emphasises that 
the Intervention Brigade is an exceptional and unique mandate67, with its creation it has become 
indispensable to clarify the obligations of peacekeepers under international law, that including the 
law of armed conflict. 
1.3. Conclusion of Part 1 
Peacekeeping has been regarded as a valuable tool at the SC’s disposal to assist countries in their 
transition from conflict to peace. The important execution of peacekeepers’ tasks justifies their 
extensive protection under IHL, the necessity for immunities as UN personnel and their TCCs 
interest to protect their military forces from attack and foreign prosecution. While initial PKO 
mandates where deployed on consent from all parties to a conflict, pledging impartiality as well 
as abstention from force, the SC has increasingly authorized missions on the legal basis of 
Chapter VII of the UNC. Indeed, peacekeepers were initially not intended to become engaged in 
hostilities, but with an increased legitimization of the execution of mandates “by all necessary 
means”, especially in volatile environments, has brought the two initially contradicting domains 
of “peace-keeping” and the “laws of war” closer together than ever. Especially with the 
formation of the Intervention Brigade under MONUSCO, the UN has for the first time explicitly 
authorized a PKO to deploy offensive military force in support of a party to a conflict, which 
allows for re-consideration of the mission’s peacekeepers legal status and their possible 
obligations under the law of armed conflict. To address this, the second part of this thesis outlines 
to what degree IHL applies to the conflict in the DRC, which is necessary for the subsequent 
analysis of the relationship between UN peacekeeping, the Intervention Brigade and the law of 
armed conflict.  
2. THE APPLICABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW TO THE 
CONFLICT IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO 
The applicability of IHL to PKOs has been a controversial debate, reflecting that peacekeeping 
was originally not designed to resort to actions covered by this set of laws.68 Additionally, PKOs 
were, as subsidiary organs to the UN, who is neither a Signatory to the GCs of 1949 nor to their 
Additional Protocols of 1977 and 2005, considered as being bound by the obligations of IHL 
deriving from these treaties.69 However, the Intervention Brigade’s involvement in the conflict in 
the DRC justifies the consideration when and under which circumstances the rules regulating the 
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respective conflict become relevant, and even obligatory, for MONUSCO’s peacekeepers. Thus, 
in the following, the scope and substance of IHL applicable to the conflict in the DRC are 
analysed. Essentially, the existence of a conflict is a prerequisite for the applicability of the laws 
of armed conflict, meaning that that hostilities must be exercised with a sufficient level of 
intensity.70 Furthermore, the rules set out in the GCs apply differently according to the nature of a 
respective conflict, offering a more extensive protection in IACs, giving relevance to all four GCs 
of 1949 in their entirety, than in non-international armed conflicts (NIACs), where essentially 
Common Article 3 and the Additional Protocol II (AP II) apply. This second part of the thesis 
outlines firstly, the scope of the applicable IHL to the conflict in the Congo, and, secondly, the 
outlines the general substance of IHL rules applicable. 
2.1. The Scope of International Humanitarian Law applicable to the 
Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
In order to identify which rules govern the hostilities in the DRC, and to what extent the warring 
parties are bound by them, it must be identified whether the relevant conflict is of international or 
non-international nature.71 The hostilities in the Congo are essentially fought on the territory of 
the DRC between the government’s armed forces and numerous non-state armed groups.72 Indeed, 
acknowledging the complexity of the conflict in the DRC73, this thesis will focus directly on the 
FARDC’s fight against Mayi-Mayi groups and Kamuina Nsapu (KN) rebels, in the Eastern 
Congo (North Kivu74 and Kasai region, see Annex I), where the Intervention Brigade is deployed, 
as MONUSCO has been active with regard to these hostilities. As the FARDC seems to be the 
only the state-party directly involved in the fight against these rebel group75, it appears reasonable 
to investigate first whether the conflict qualifies as non-international within the reading of the 
GCs and APII, before subsequently accounting for the possibilities of it constituting an IAC.  
2.1.1. Non-International Armed Conflict 
Essentially, a conflict must meet several criteria to trigger IHL applicability to NIACs. These are 
outlined in the definition of a NIAC in Article 1 of AP II Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts of 1977, which identifies NIACs as 
all armed conflicts […] which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between 
its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under 
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responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to 
carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.
76
 
In further reading, AP II deliberately excludes from its scope “situations of internal disturbances 
and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence” which simply are not 
considered sufficiently strong to qualify as conflict.77 It follows that for domestic hostilities to 
amount to a NIAC, two core conditions must be met: Firstly, the warring parties must reflect an 
organizational structure which allows them to exercise coordinated operations, such as a 
functional line of command, access to necessary logistics, and the group’s ability to “respect and 
ensure respect” for IHL.78 Secondly, the hostilities must meet certain threshold of intensity for 
qualifying as a NIAC.79 
 
Indeed, while the warring in the eastern DRC essentially takes place between numerous 
organized armed groups, reports of hostilities clearly reflect their capability to exercise 
coordinated military operations as attacks are recurring and systematically-targeted on the 
FARDC and MONUSCO throughout the year 2017 in the South Kivu and Kasai region (mainly 
perpetrated by Mayi-Mayi and KN groups). 80  The ability to exercise such sustained targeted 
operations reflects sufficient organization and command structure needed to render the rebel 
groups combatants and to bind them by IHL relevant to NIAC. Additionally, reports on the 
security situation in eastern DRC clearly outline that required intensity is reached. Especially the 
Kasai-Region has been arena to intense violence since early 2016, with over 60 militia groups 
fighting against one another. As of June 2017, 3,383 people had been killed, many of which 
civilians, and in late 2017, 1.4 million people were displaced from only this regional crisis.81 
Apart from the Kasai region, most violence has been exercised in the eastern provinces of the of 
the DRC. 82  Especially in North and South Kivu (Annex I), clashes between the FARDC, 
essentially directed against the Mayi-Mayi and KN militia,  reached the threshold of a war in 
201683 with more than 4,000 casualties as of mid-2017 and more than 600,000 displaced people.84 
In the second half of 2017, the security situation in many areas of the DRC was reported as 
having deteriorated, characterized by an increased targeting of the FARDC by the Mayi-Mayi 
rebels85 , and was subsequently classified having escalated from a “limited […] to a full-scale 
war.”86 It follows that the conflict in the DRC, with special regard to the eastern regions, has 
triggered the applicability of IHL relevant to NIACs.  
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2.1.2. International Armed Conflict 
The lack of direct involvement of another state-party, which is the essential characteristic for an 
IAC as provided for in the GCs’ Common Article 287, allows to assume the existence of a conflict 
of non-international nature. However, valid consideration must be given to the role of foreign 
involvement in the conflict, as several rebel groups are suspected to receive support from 
neighboring states, i.e. from Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi 88 , and as the “automatic 
internationalization” of a NIAC by the presence of UN-forces has been given attention in 
academic literature. 89  However, based on the current situation, both considerations can be 
rendered obsolete. In order to justify for the internationalization of a NIAC through foreign state-
support to militias, outside involvement is required to be exercised through “effective control” 
over a supported non-state actor, who is opposing their respective government. 90
 Such “effective 
control” must extend beyond financial and resource support, which has not been proven for the 
rebel-groups in the DRC.91 Furthermore, the “automatic internationalization” by the fact of UN 
engagement, especially through the Intervention Brigade as an offensive force exclusively 
composed of foreign soldiers, does not render the conflict in the DRC international either, as it 
acts in support of the FARDC and not against it. Equally, would another state intervene on 
request of the Congolese government, it would become engaged side-by-side with it in a NIAC, a 
situation that can be compared to the Intervention Brigade’s involvement.92 Moreover, this theory 
overlooks the separate legal personality of the UN, which is commanding the Intervention 
Brigade essentially under its own control93, as opposed to situations where foreign states would 
become engaged in a domestic conflict out of sovereign interests. At most, due to the 
international component the UN mission adds to the hostilities in the DRC, hostilities could be 
classified as “a subset of [a] multinational NIAC”.94 However, to identify the extent of applicable 
law to the parties involved, such differentiation is not decisive, as the GCs merely distinguish 
between IACs and NIACs.95  
 
Nonetheless, the consideration of an internationalization of the conflict in DRC is especially 
fruitful as IHL offers an extensive protection to situations of IAC, essentially applying all four 
GCs of 1949 apply in their entirety, including the provisions laid down in APs I (1977) and III 
(2005) - provided the respective State Parties have ratified them. The GCs applicable provide for 
extensive protection regarding the treatment of the wounded and sick at field96 and at sea97, 
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prisoners of war (PoWs) 98 , and civilians during wartime. 99  In addition to AP I, Additional 
Protocol III sets out the use of the red crystal emblem for the protection of humanitarian 
personnel (2005)100 to IACs. Furthermore, and subject to more detailed analysis in the third part 
of this thesis, the 1994 Convention’s scope ceases to apply its immunities and protections for UN 
personnel in IACs, provided they are therein engaged as combatants. 101 However, based on the 
current facts of the situation, an internationalization of the conflict in the DRC is subject to 
speculation. It follows that, with the FARDC as the only state-party directly involved in 
continuous and reoccurring armed hostilities against organized armed rebel groups in the eastern 
regions, the portions of IHL relating to conflicts not of international nature apply, which are 
outlined subsequently. 
2.2. The Substance of International Humanitarian Law applicable to the 
Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to outline the substance of applicable IHL rules in detail, 
however it is adequate to provide an overview to what extent parties to the conflict in the DRC 
are obliged to abide by the respective Conventions. The GCs and their APs, as the main 
codifications of IHL, concern themselves with the regulation of the means (weaponry causing 
unnecessary suffering)102 and methods (proportionality, distinction, humanity, and precaution of 
attacks) of warfare, for the sake of the protection of non-combatants in armed conflicts. 103 
However, as the conflict in the DRC qualifies as a NIAC, essentially the GCs’ Common Article 3 
and the full AP II, outline the codified rules regulating the domestic hostilities. 104 According to 
the preamble of AP II, the foundation for the protection of persons in NIACs is enshrined in 
Common Article 3. Consequently, each party to a NIAC is, at a minimum, obliged to abide by the 
principle of humane treatment to civilians, non-combatants, and hors de combat “without any 
adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth or any other 
similar criteria” and to provide the sick and wounded with adequate care. 105  Furthermore, 
Common Article 3 prohibits, regardless of place and time, to commit on these protected persons, 
the following crimes 
a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment 
and torture; b) taking of hostages; c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment; d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of 
executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, 
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affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized 
peoples.
106
 
In addition, AP II on the Protection of Victims in NIACs supplements Common Article 3, and 
applies in its entirety, that is if the respective conflict is exercised in the territory a signatory state, 
repeating the humane treatment to non-combatants 107  and according special protection the 
casualties of war, the wounded, sick, or shipwrecked. 108  Furthermore, AP II outlines the 
protection of the civilian population, whose direct targeting, as the essence of the principle of 
distinction, is prohibited “at all times”109, which is in line with the obligation to “ensure respect 
for and protection of the civilian population.”110 While only a small part of codified IHL rules 
appear to apply in NIACs, the universal ratification of all four GCs has allowed the majority of 
the set of the law of armed conflict to gain customary status111, rendering them equally applicable 
in NIACS as in IACs, and regardless of the legal status of a party (be it non-state or state actors, 
or Signatories to the GCs or not).112 Such urge for universal compliance is especially crucial to 
the conflict in the DRC, as most actors involved, such as various rebel groups and also 
MONUSCO as a “subsidiary organ” to the UN113, are not Signatories to the GCs, but are bound 
by most customary IHL rules nonetheless.  
2.3. The Enforcement of the applicable International Humanitarian Law 
However, the mere identification of IHL applicability in the Congolese war is not a reflection that 
it is complied with, implemented and enforced. Witnessing a failed domestic justice system, 
international criminal law became essential in holding accountable perpetrators of grave breaches 
of GC’s Common Article 3 (war crimes) 114 and crimes against humanity.115 In light of grave 
violations of IHL going unpunished, the ICC opened his Office of the Prosecutor to the conflict 
in 2004, after the DRC ratified the Rome Statute and referred its domestic situation to the Court’s 
jurisdiction. 116  Reports over impunity for war crimes and crimes against humanity, such as 
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patterns of rape, conscription of child soldiers, attacking civilians, mutilation, torture, and cruel 
treatment, and pillaging (all breaches under Customary IHL Rules, or Common Article 3) led the 
ICC to extend its jurisdiction to  prosecute perpetrators of crimes committed in connection with 
the conflict, especially in the eastern, DRC (and Ituri, North and South Kivu, see Annex I) from 
July 2002 onwards. 117  In 2014, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (former president of the Union des 
Patriotes Congolais, UPC) was convicted of the war crime of conscripting child soldiers. 118
 
 
Commander Bosco Ntaganda (UPC) is currently accused of several war crimes (13 counts), for 
conscription of child soldiers, rape, attacking of protected objects, destroying the enemies 
property, sexual slavery. 119
 
As of 2018, the ICC has delivered six decisions, convicting 
commanders and heads of rebel groups for numerous crimes against humanity and war crimes 
under Articles 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute (e.g. conscription of child soldiers, rape, attacking of 
protected objects and persons, sexual slavery).120 Furthermore, as MONUSCO itself is mandated 
to assist in the enforcement of the substantive IHL rules, by cooperation with the Congolese 
government, regional states and the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, to bring perpetrators of 
international crimes to justice.121  In line with this, the UN SG Report of 2017 on the DRC 
reflects that MONUSCO assisted in convicting and sentencing a FARDC colonel and war 
criminal 122  and identified leaders of rebel groups who had been wanted for crimes against 
humanity.123 Above all, efforts for holding accountable perpetrators of grave breaches of IHL 
have proven important for the protection and compensation of victims to the armed conflict. As 
the GCs concern themselves in the first place with the protection of vulnerable persons during 
armed conflict, assuring their fundamental guarantees124, the ICC brought reparation to victims of 
grave breaches of IHL. So, did the ICC’s Trial Chamber in 2016 compensate the 297 victims of 
the Katanga Case for their suffering from the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed 
on them. 125 In December 2016, the ICC Trial Chamber II established Lubanga’s liability for 
collective reparations to victims, more than 400 direct and indirect victims, at $ 10 million 
USD.126 It follows that the ICC, MONUSCO and the government of the DRC cooperate in the 
enforcement of substantive IHL, by identifying commissioners of grave breaches of the GCs, and 
by delivering justice to those who have suffered from the conflict.  
2.4. Conclusion of Part 2  
The second part of this thesis outlined the scope, substance, and enforceability of IHL applicable 
to the conflict in the DRC. Hostilities in the eastern DRC are primarily fought between organized 
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armed rebel groups and between the government of the DRC, thus qualifying the conflict of 
being of non-international nature. It follows that the law respective to NIACs applies, which 
essentially demands the hostilities in the DRC to be exercised in compliance with the GCs’ 
Common Article 3, AP II, as well as customary IHL rules. Furthermore, the ICC’s prosecution of 
crimes committed in the context of the armed conflict reflect the DRC’s willingness to enforce 
the applicable IHL rules, as well as attempts to deliver reparations to victims. Thus, in order to 
establish whether MONUSCO’s Intervention Brigade is equally bound by the IHL rules 
applicable to the conflict in the DRC, the following part of the thesis outlines under what 
conditions UN peacekeepers are regarded as subjects to IHL, and whether personnel of the 
Intervention Brigade qualify as such with respect to their engagement in the conflict at hand.  
3. THE APPLICABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW TO 
PEACEKEEPING  
Keeping in mind that PKOs were not considered during the drafting of the GCs, the UN 
recognized in the 1960s the necessity of its forces to “observe the principles and spirit” of 
international treaties regulating military conduct. 127  As of today, underlining dedication and 
respect for international law, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) obliges its 
personnel, be they deployed by a robust or a “weak” mandate, to take the oath to “comply with 
the Guidelines of [IHL] for Forces Undertaking [UN PKOs] and the applicable portions of the 
[UDHR] as the fundamental basis for our standards”128, a provision that is reflected in many 
SOFAs of PKOs.129 Indeed, while these provisions fail to elaborate in detail which rules these 
“guidelines and principles” comprise, the applicability of IHL to UN forces has become 
somewhat more straightforward with the 1994 Convention and the 1999  Bulletin, as well as with 
international case law establishing (military-)peacekeepers’ entitlement to civilian protection in 
armed conflicts.130 The relevance of all three sources  to military-peacekeepers’ protection but 
also obligations deriving from the applicable IHL to the DRC  is specified subsequently.  
3.1. The 1994 Convention: Continuous Protection 
As outlined in the first part of this thesis, the 1994 Convention was introduced with the intention 
to protect peacekeepers form becoming targets of attacks in armed conflict, rendering aggressions 
towards them illegal.131 Case law refined the temporal limit of protection to peacekeepers under 
IHL. Consequently, in outlining whether the killing of peacekeepers amounted to a war crime, the 
ICC assessed in Abu Garda the victim’s status at the time of the commission of the crime132 
identifying whether, at the very moment of attack, the peacekeepers retained their protected status 
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or whether they were taking active part in hostilities, which would have qualified their targeting 
legitimate.133 Furthermore, while the 1994 Convention emphasises in Art. 20(a) that the provided 
immunities and privileges shall not interfere with the applicability of IHL134, the criminalization 
of targeting peacekeepers appears problematic considering that the Convention limits its 
protective scope only in situations in which military-peacekeepers are involved “as combatants 
against organized armed forces and to which the law of international armed conflict applies 
[emphasis added].” 135 Indeed, the wording of the 1994 Convention overlooks the fact that PKOs 
are rarely deployed in situations of ongoing IACs and are more likely to become engaged in 
NIACs136, as it appears to be the case for the Intervention Brigade in the DRC. A coexistence of 
the Convention’s provisions in parallel to the laws of NIAC would create a double-standard for 
military-peacekeepers. 137  On the one hand, it would continuously criminalize of their direct 
targeting, despite their active engagement in hostilities of non-international nature138, while, on 
the other hand, it would provide continuous immunity for military-peacekeepers as TTCs’ reserve 
their exclusive jurisdiction for “any criminal offence […] committed […] in the host country” of 
deployment.139 Responding with concern to the lacking clarity of the 1994 Convention with 
respect to situations of NIAC, it has been criticized by scholars as allowing for “privileging one 
particular group of soldiers over others.”140 The possible effects of the 1994 Convention on the 
accountability of personnel to the Intervention Brigade for grave breaches of IHL allow for valid 
discussion in part IV of this thesis.  
3.2. The 1999 Bulletin: Observance of International Humanitarian Law  
In acknowledging that robust peacekeeping-mandates have moved closer to the domain of IHL, 
the 1999 Bulletin has proven to be a crucial instrument clarifying parts of the contradiction 
caused by the 1994 Convention. Indeed, the Bulletin pledges that its provision would not 
interfere with the protections laid down by the 1994 Convention, for the period that peacekeepers 
enjoy the status of non-combatants that entitles them to civilian protection under “the 
international law of armed conflict.”141 Such wording reads as if the Bulletin does not, as opposed 
to the 1994 Convention, limit the necessary observance of IHL by peacekeepers dependent upon 
the nature of a conflict at hand, but rather based on the status of the peacekeepers themselves. It 
follows that the Bulletin requires IHL to be observed 
in situations of armed conflict [where peacekeepers] are actively engaged therein as 
combatants, to the extent and for the duration of their engagement.
142 
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This provision appears narrow in scope indeed, limiting the applicability of IHL to peacekeepers 
strictly to the time and place of the exercise of combat activity, such as for situations of self-
defense of for enforcement actions where resort to force is permitted.143 Accordingly, as opposed 
to the 1994 Convention, peacekeepers having become engaged in hostilities in the DRC, be it 
through enforcement action or for defence-purposes, are deprived of their status as non-
combatants, qualify as legitimate targets, and are bound to follow IHL “for the extent and […] 
duration” they are actively deploying force. Such narrow scope allows to question whether the 
mandate of the Intervention Brigade itself sets the framework of “extent and duration”, or 
whether Intervention-peacekeepers really are bound by IHL only for the specific time they are 
launching a military operation. 
 
For situations in which peacekeepers do qualify as combatants, the Bulletin obliges them to 
exercise their operations in abidance to the principles and rules of “general conventions 
applicable to the conduct of military personnel”, outlining minimum standards of fundamental 
IHL rules in a non-exhaustive list for conducting PKOs. Essentially, the outlined rules closely 
resemble the applicable portion of IHL to NIACs144, which is, as identified previously, already 
relevant regarding the armed conflict in the DRC. Yet, as the Bulletin presents a non-exhaustive 
selection of rules, it allows for the conclusion that military-peacekeepers may be subjected to a 
more extensive scope of IHL if a conflict situation requires it. For the enforceability of IHL, the 
Bulletin outlines that breaches of the outlined provisions and for violations of IHL, primary 
jurisdiction over military-peacekeepers is allocated to their respective TCCs.145 This provision 
reminds once again of the reservation of exclusive jurisdiction over military-contingents by TCCs, 
as outlined previously, which are set out in SOFAs and MoUs for troop-contributions. The effects 
of such reservations on the accountability of peacekeepers for grave breaches of IHL will be 
addressed further in the fourth part of this thesis. In line with the 1999 Bulletin, the accountability 
for violations of IHL diminishes as soon as military-peacekeepers are not anymore actively 
engaged in hostilities. It appears that, as soon as resort to force ceases, as military-peacekeepers 
fall outside the scope of IHL again, and back in to their entitlement to civilian protection.  
 
The end of this section specified under what circumstances IHL is applicable to peacekeeping. It 
follows that peacekeepers are bound by the regime of IHL, through the narrow scope provided 
for by the 1999 Bulletin, namely for the very specific time and duration they are actively engaged 
as combatants in an armed conflict. However, it appears that the Bulletin, at its time of drafting, 
did not consider PKOs of the robustness of MONUSCO, equipped with the offensive capabilities 
of the Intervention Brigade. The Bulletin’s provision that peacekeepers are bound “for the time 
and duration” they are acting as combatants would need clarification for this specific mission. 
Regarding the nature of conflict, peacekeepers’ obligation to abide by IHL rules when engaged in 
hostilities during an IAC are straight forward, while the 1994 Convention allows for uncertainty 
as to whether it continues to provide for immunities and privileges when peacekeepers are 
engaged in NIACs, and whether their direct targeting continues to be unlawful. After identifying 
the scope and substance of IHL applicable to the conflict in the DRC and to the applicability of 
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IHL to UN peacekeepers in general, the following section will answer the second sub-question, 
namely whether and to what extent MONUSCO, more specifically the personnel of the 
Intervention Brigade, is bound by IHL.  
3.3. The Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to the 
Intervention Brigade 
Earlier in thesis, it was established that MONUSCO is deployed in the territory of an ongoing 
armed conflict between the DRC and non-state organized armed groups. The conflict has been 
identified as a NIAC during which the main warring parties, the FARDC and militias, must 
respect the IHL of NIAC when engaging in hostilities against one another. 146  However, the 
simple presence of a PKO, in the territory of an ongoing NIAC does not qualify their 
peacekeepers, be their mandate robust or not, as combatants. 147  Thus, in order to establish 
whether and for what extent the Intervention Brigade is bound by IHL, it is necessary to analyze 
two key-issues: The role of the Intervention Brigade in the ongoing armed conflict, and, 
acknowledging that it is not a state-actor, its characteristics for qualifying as combatants in line 
with Art. 4 GC IV.148 
 
In advocating for a broad applicability of IHL, the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) has judged the mandate of a PKO to be irrelevant for the applicability of IHL in 
situations when UN contingents resort to force. 149 Nonetheless, Resolution 2409 (2018) proves 
valuable in assessing the role the Intervention Brigade plays in the DRC. As outlined previously, 
the UN SC has deployed the Intervention Brigade since its creation “in support of the authorities 
of the DRC” for the neutralization of organized armed groups posing a threat to state authority 
and to the protection of civilian in the eastern regions of the DRC. 150
 
A statement as 
straightforward as this, pledging support to the state-actor in a NIAC, has been interpreted as 
qualifying the Intervention Brigade as a party to the conflict.
 151 Indeed, in further reading of the 
mandate, the deployment of offensive force is exercised “with the support of the whole of 
MONUSCO” 152 which has been interpreted as not only qualifying the offensive-military force, 
but also the military-contingents not authorized with the Intervention Brigade’s authorization to 
force, and even the entire MONUSCO mission as a party to the conflict.153 Such uncertainty 
leaves IHL obligations and protections dangerously open for interpretation. Certainly, when only 
accounting for the Intervention Brigade, it is deployed in consent and in cooperation with the 
Congolese government, with its armed forces mandated to launch military operations against 
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non-state groups in the country, which establishes that it is a party to the conflict. 154 Such support 
has manifested in form of specific operations on the Congolese ground. Reports reflect that 
continuous cooperation between the mission and FARDC in several confrontations against rebel 
groups, such as, but not limited to, confrontations with Mayi-Mayi rebels or Allied Democratic 
Forces (ADF) in Northern Kivu155, as well as the Intervention Brigade’s direct involvement in 
two large-scale operations against the ADF, Usalama I and II.156  
 
Moreover, the Intervention Brigade reflects all requirements set out by the Art. 2 of AP II, but 
also Art. 4 of the Third GC on the protection of prisoners of war (PoWs). Indeed, the Intervention 
Brigade seems best caught by Art. 4 of the Third GC, qualifying them for the PoW status as 
“[m]embers of other militias […], belonging to a party to the conflict and operating in or outside 
their own territory”157 under the condition that they are subordinated to a responsible commander, 
distinguishing themselves from civilians through distinct emblems, carry arms openly, and 
conduct their operations in line with IHL.158  Command responsibility for PKOs is provided for 
by respective MoUs and SOFAs159, charging Contingent Commanders (that is for the Intervention 
Brigade Malawi, Tanzania, and South Africa160) with the primary obligation to ensure compliance 
and respect of laws. The entire Intervention Brigade is subjected to the MONUSCO Force 
Commander, who oversees the entire 16,215 military personnel of MONUSCO.161 The issue of 
distinction between the Intervention Brigade and the MONUSCO as a whole has been subject to 
much debate, arguing that the lines are not drawn clearly enough between personnel engaged in 
the conflict, and peacekeepers continuously enjoying civilian protection,162 as the Intervention 
Brigade shares the same facilities as the MONUSCO, and the convoys are used 
interchangeably. 163  This situation can prove problematic as it might endanger MONUSCO’s 
personnel not part of the Intervention Brigade, and thus should be entitled to the civilian 
protection even when the Brigade resorts to force.164 Furthermore, in line with MONUSCO’s 
mandate, the Intervention Brigade is expected to engage in military operations under strict 
“compliance with international law, including international humanitarian law.”165 In terms of 
intensity, the conflict between various rebel groups and the Congolese government has previously 
been established as meeting the required threshold for a NIAC, thus MONUSCO’s identification 
as a party therein should be sufficient to bind them by the Common Article 3 and Customary IHL. 
Yet, in assuming the intensity of use of force directed between the Brigade and opposing non-
state armed groups, several reports on the military operations in the region reflect peacekeeper-
casualties166, and the MONUSCO’s awareness that their launching of operations in the Kasai 
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region potentially threatens the safety of (non-combatant) MONUSCO peacekeepers.167 Thus, 
fulfilling all these criteria, many scholars have criticized the prior classification of peacekeepers 
as entitled to the civilian status as inappropriate, witnessing a new generation of “heavy armed, 
organized group under responsible command complying with the laws of armed conflict and 
legally authorized to use offensive force.”168 Thus, accounting for the Intervention Brigade’s 
involvement in the DRC, it is only reasonable that its personnel must comply with the IHL 
applicable to the respective conflict.  
3.3.1. The Equal Application of International Humanitarian Law to Combatants 
Qualifying as an active party to the conflict in the DRC, the Intervention Brigade is bound by 
Common Article 3 and customary IHL on the ground of the principle of equal application of IHL 
to combatants. Set out by the AP I, and subsequently codified in CIL Rule 139169, this important 
notion marks the distinction of the ius in bello from the ius ad bellum regime. It accordingly 
outlines that IHL  
must be fully applied in all circumstances to all persons who are protected by those 
instruments, without any adverse distinction based on the nature or origin of the armed 
conflict or on the causes espoused by or attributed to the Parties to the conflict  [emphasis 
added].
170
 
Such distinction of ius in bello from ius ad bellum proves especially relevant for MONUSCO’s 
Intervention Brigade, as it is installed by the legitimacy of international community through 
unanimous approval of the UN SC171, serving to maintain international peace and security It 
follows that IHL to IAC binds a warring party, regardless of them not having ratified the GCs (as 
outlined previously, this is the case for the UN), and despite any justifications voiced for its resort 
to force. In another wording, customary IHL Rule 139 expects all parties to a conflict to “respect 
and ensure respect for [IHL] by its armed forces.”172 However, it can be questioned how “equal” 
the application of IHL to peacekeepers as opposed to other parties to the conflict really is. While 
the 1999 Bulletin outlines such applicability only for the limited time and duration they are 
directly taking part in hostilities173, its narrow scope allows to question whether the mandate of 
the Intervention Brigade already sets the required the framework of “extent and duration”, as the 
fundamental idea behind its deployment is the active engagement in the conflict as combatants in 
support of the government. Indeed, if the narrow scope would apply, the Intervention Brigade 
would reserve their protected status under Customary Rule 33 174  for the majority of their 
deployment and their entitlement to the civilian protection as set out in ICL, rendering their 
intentional targeting a war crime.175 Further, in line with the 1994 Convention, their direct killing 
would be criminalized any time, unless the law of IAC begins to apply. Such an interpretation of 
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both documents would favour the personnel of the  Intervention Brigade clearly over other 
parties to the conflict, and fundamentally contradicts the principle of equal application of IHL. 
However, taking into account the overarching interest of TCCs to know their troops safe and well, 
and accounting for the customary nature of the  protection of peacekeepers through CIL Rule 139, 
their continous protection almost appear deliberate. Yet, while it is generally established that the 
Intervention Brigade is equally obliged to follow IHL, at least for the time they engage in combat, 
it is valid to investigate further whether the current framework regulating troop-contributions and 
UN immunities allows also for the equal enforcement thereof. 
3.4. Conclusion of Part 3 
It follows that by the end the third part of this thesis, it was clarified that IHL must apply to the 
MONUSCO mission, at least for the time and duration that its personnel is actively engaged as 
participants in the respective hostilities. Moreover, with regard to the Intervention Brigade’s 
presence in the DRC, who is acting in support of the Congolese government and qualifies as a 
party to the conflict, peacekeepers must observe Common Article 3 of the GCs, AP II, as well as 
customary IHL, for the period that they are actively engaged in hostilities, for the extent and 
duration of such engagement. Moreover, despite contradictory wording of the 1994 Convention, 
despite their engagement in a conflict “only” of non-international nature, the application of IHL 
to military-peacekeepers of the Intervention Brigade in the DRC is crucial for the principle of 
equal application of IHL to belligerents.176 More consideration will be given in the next chapter to 
the enforceability of grave breaches of IHL, considering whether personnel of the Intervention 
Brigade are, or at least can be, held accountable individually for grave breaches of IHL, either 
nationally or internationally, in light of the current UN system for accountability, the legal 
framework governing troop-contributions, as well as the complementary nature of the ICC 
jurisdiction. 
4. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR GRAVE BREACHES OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
Under their mandate, the MONUSCO mission holds special responsibility to shield the civilian 
society from violations of their human rights and breaches of IHL resulting from the ongoing 
armed conflict. 177  In line with this  duty, the mandate is charged with the identification of 
perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the DRC in order to hold 
them accountable accordingly. 178 With respect to its deployment in the DRC, the UN has faced 
criticism when in a number of occasions their PKOs failed to fulfil their mandate for civilian 
protection, such as in 2012, when MONUSCO remained inactive when the M23 rebel group 
committed large-scale violations of HR and IHL in Goma, and in 2014, when MONUSCO did 
nothing to prevent a massacre in Mutarule, despite receiving crucial information that killings 
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were about to happen.179 In this respect, the accountability of the UN itself to harm caused under 
its control is a field for further consideration, which, however,  lies beyond the scope of this 
thesis to address. Moreover,  while the previous mentioned cases bear witness of MONUSCO’s 
neglect to mandate obligations, it must be considered how the UN responds when their own 
personnel would become direct violators of IHL. Overall, criminal accountability of peacekeepers 
has widely been discussed in academic literature180, as allegations against peacekeepers for sex 
crimes on the host population and their subsequent immunity, as well as lacking accountability 
have questioned the disciplinary system and the morale of the UN.181 While most such reports of 
impunity for crimes do not necessarily relate to breaches of the laws armed conflict, the fact that 
the 1999 Bulletin equally allocates exclusive jurisdiction to TCCs for the prosecution of 
violations of IHL182 allows for the assumptions that accountability mechanisms should be similar 
to those of domestic law enforcement.  
Indeed, the core feature of a war crimes is the environment in which they are perpetrated, namely 
in the context of and in connection with an armed conflict.
 183 Article 8 of the Rome Statute 
distinguishes between war crimes committed during IACs and NIACs, nonetheless prohibiting in 
internal conflicts serious violations of Common Article 3 to the GCs, including the prohibition of 
“outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment” against 
civilians.184 Acknowledging that the authorization of the Intervention Brigade to engage in an 
armed conflict and engage in combat, it further reflects the potential to cause great damage 
during missions that would inevitably stand in connection with the armed conflict, a 
consideration that cannot exclude grave breaches of IHL and their perpetrators’ individual 
criminal responsibility.185 For the effective functioning of PKOs the domestic jurisdiction of the 
respective host-country is mainly excluded from the prosecution of military-personnel. Indeed, it 
is said that the functioning of the UN peacekeeping-system would be hindered if peacekeepers 
were subjected to local jurisdictions, under which prosecution often is suspected to be “politically 
motivated”.186Thus in the following, the systems for accountability for crimes committed by 
military-peacekeepers will be investigated by directing attention to the UN, TCCs, and the role of 
the ICC in bringing potential violators of IHL to trial. 
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4.1. The United Nations System of Accountability 
Upon establishment of the Special Court of Sierra Leone in 2000, the UN SG stated that the UN 
would not grant amnesty for grave violations of IHL, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes, implying that no person, and peacekeeping personnel neither, should be  immune 
from such crimes.187 However, the UN lacks the judicial power and the prison facilities necessary 
for the prosecution and enforcement of this principle. Despite the duty of MONUSCO 
peacekeepers to comply with the applicable IHL in the DRC, the very nature of the UN 
peacekeeping system has reflected difficulties to hold individual peacekeepers accountable for 
serious crimes.
 188  Indeed, the 1994 Convention and the Model SOFA the that military-
peacekeepers are, for “any criminal offence […] committed […] in the host country”, forwarded 
to be prosecuted by their respective TCC who reserves exclusive jurisdiction over them.189 Thus, 
the UN’s core role in  holding accountable peacekeepers are the prevention and reporting 
mechanisms for such crimes. 
Despite the UN’s efforts for improvement, reporting mechanisms have been labelled as “deficient” 
and “biased”, as review bodies for crimes are set up by the UN on an ad-hoc basis after a need-
assessment which is evaluated, similarly, by the UN.190 Furthermore, witnesses of crimes are 
deterred by the organization’s weak whistle-blower protection, that does not even reprieve high 
ranking UN officials from expulsion, as witnessed in 2015 in the Anders Kompass Case.191 In 
2014, Anders Kompass, Director at the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR), leaked a report of confidential investigative notes to national authorities, in this case 
France, of the perpetrators of child abuse in the CAR, which included “identifying information 
[…]  to the child-victims”. 192  In March 2015, the Under-Secretary General of the DPKO 
requested Kompass’ resignation, and later placing him on administrative leave to “avoid any 
interference with the investigation”.193  While it has not been established that the respective crime 
had taken place in connection with an ongoing armed conflict, nor that  the child-abusers 
committed a grave breach of the GCs, it reflects that the UN has not always been successful in 
adequately responding to its personnel’s criminal conduct, nor in providing victims with fair 
remedy or justice.194  
Even though MONUSCO, and with it the Intervention Brigade, stands under the control of the 
UN (under the MONUSCO Force Commander), the organization can at most expell military-
personnel from the respective contingent, but has no competence to hold perpetrators individually 
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criminally responsible.195 For severe crimes, the UN’s legal personality merely authorizes it, in 
line with the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities for its personnel, to “institute 
legal proceedings”196 and to “waive the immunity of its representative in any case [it] would 
impede the course of justice”, regardless of the initial purpose of the immunity.197  Such cases 
would consequently be forwarded to the respective TCCs. 
Recently, however, as a response to high allegations of unpunished crimes committed by 
peacekeepers, the UN has made efforts to enforce compliance duties outlined in SOFAs and 
MoUs to adequately prosecute perpetrators of crimes committed while on mission. It follows that 
with the establishment of SC Resolution 2272 (2016), the SG may expell an entire contingent 
from a mission if the respective personnel is found to repeatedly commit crimes, and the 
respective TCC failed to provide adequate punishment.198 The Resolution further emphasises the 
TCC’s primary responsibility to investigate and prosecute, but also to implement vetting 
processes and pre-deployment training for the soldiers they are going to send on mission.
 199While 
the resolution focuses primarily on sex-crimes, it clearly reflects that the UN has taken efforts to 
enforce its HR and IHL standards. Indeed, with merely Egypt abstaining, fearing this step would 
amount to practices of collective punishment
 
to TCCs200, the resolution was adopted with 14 
votes in favour, setting a clear sign for willingness to improve for disciplinary measures for the 
sustainability of missions’ efforts and preservation of UN reputation. 201  Yet, the actual 
prosecution of commissioners of international crimes remains with the respective TCCs.  
4.2. National Prosecution of Grave Breaches of International 
Humanitarian Law 
In order to effectively enforce compliance and the respect for the laws of armed conflict, the GCs 
demand High Contracting Parties to put in place adequate law to provide “effective penal 
sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any crime of the grave breaches 
of [IHL].”202 As outlined, the UN does not possess such legislative power, and it follows that the 
enforcement of IHL depends on state willingness and capability to discipline and prosecute their 
military-contingents.203 Respectively, the MoU provides that 
military members […] are subject to the Government’s exclusive jurisdiction in respect of 
any crimes or offences that might be committed by them while they are assigned to the 
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military contingent of [UN PKO]. The Government assures the United Nations that it shall 
exercise such jurisdiction with respect to such crimes or offences [emphasis added].
204 
Further in the MoU, the TCCs pledge to cooperate in the prosecution of their personnel, which 
includes to report serious crimes to the UN as well as allocates to them the primary responsibility 
to investigate.205 While the MoU does not specify on the nature of the crime, the 1999 Bulletin 
affirms that this exclusive jurisdiction equally covers violations of IHL which must be brought 
before the national courts of TCCs.206 From a victim’s perspective these provisions can pose 
obstacles to pursue trial, as the TCCs’ reservation on exclusive jurisdiction poses hindrances of 
geographical 207 , political, and legal nature. 208  When a perpetrator is prosecuted for crimes 
committed while on duty, it is often done in safe geographical distance from the crime scene’s 
victims, witnesses, and decisive evidence, rendering proceedings costly and lengthy.209 It follows 
that impunity for crimes committed while on mission does not necessarily have to be caused by a 
TCC’s bad faith, nor does this have to be the reason for which cases may be dismissed or not 
reported back to the UN.210  
Indeed, as a sign of good practice, peacekeepers have been prosecuted by their national military 
tribunals, often applying Military Codes 211  In order to hold their MONUSCO contingents 
accountable effectively in the DRC, South Africa has established a mobile military court 
Kinshasa, which has been been praised a good initiative in the struggle against impunity. 212 
Indeed, South Africa sends a strong message to other TCCs, favours victims by bringing 
proceedings closer to the crime-scene and allows peacekeepers to continue their mission with 
legitimacy. 213  While the cases heard were not registered as international crimes, and no 
information is available as to whether the defendants were members of the Intervention Brigade, 
a MONUSCO spokesperson evaluated the court as more “practical, less costly and more attentive 
to […] victims”, and as an essential part in the struggle against impunity. 214   Overall, the 
preservation of TCCs’ exclusive jurisdiction over military-contingents is fundamental for their 
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willingness to cooperate 215  – which in turn is the very core for the for functionality of 
peacekeeping.216 
4.3. The Forum of the International Criminal Court 
While this has not manifested yet in practice, the ICC has been labeled as the “most logical 
mechanism” to prosecute peacekeepers in the international criminal justice system when national 
remedies prove inadequate.217 Indeed, the ICC may prosecute over crimes committed by or in the 
territory of a Signatory State to the Rome Statute, or in a territory which has been forwarded to 
the jurisdiction of the ICC, as it is the case in the DRC.
 218 Furthermore, for crimes committed by 
a peacekeeper belonging to a TCC which is not a Signatory to the Rome Statute, the SC has by 
Resolution 1422 (2002) 219  prohibited the Court to exercise the jurisdiction, unless it is expressly 
authorized by the SC. 220  Both possibilities, the ICC’s jurisdiction over peacekeepers from 
Signatory States, as well as from non-Signatory States to the Rome Statute will be shortly 
outlined subsequently.  
4.3.1. The Prosecution of Peacekeepers from Parties to the Rome Statutes 
Since the start of its investigation in 2004, the ICC has opened its Office of the Prosecutor in the 
DRC221 it has rendered valuable judgements for crimes committed in connection with the conflict 
in eastern DRC.222 While it must be acknowledged that peacekeepers could become violators of 
IHL, the limits to the Courts jurisdiction might pose hindrances in prosecuting the commissioners 
of similar crimes in the same territory equally. Due to the ICC’s complementarity, it may only 
decide on cases where national trials have proven inadequate, provided the respective state is a 
member to the ICC.223 While all three TCCs to the Intervention Brigade, South Africa, Malawi, 
and Tanzania, are Signatories of the Rome Statute224, the Court may become engaged only in 
cases when domestic prosecution has failed.225 However, these peacekeepers can, at least in 
theory, be held individually criminally accountable before the ICC, as the Court’s admissibility 
criteria, once a crime falls into his jurisdiction, do not depend upon official capacity, or 
immunities from foreign prosecution. 226  Yet, if a peacekeeper were to commit a crime of 
sufficient gravity and in connection with an armed conflict, such as a breach of the GCs, the 
Court would only be permitted to investigate and prosecute if respective TCCs were “unwilling 
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or unable” to do so themselves. 227  As previously outlined, South Africa, as a TCC to the 
Intervention Brigade, has reflected sufficient willingness and ability.228  
4.3.2. The Prosecution of Peacekeepers from Countries not Parties to the Rome 
Statute 
Indeed, in the past, the SC has found it important to emphasise the ICC’s complementarity and 
non-universality with respect to PKOs.
 229 The SC adopted Resolution 1422 (2002) upon the 
creation of the ICC, restated that neither all member states to the UN nor all TCCs to PKOs are 
parties to the Rome Statute. In this respect, the SC underlined that it is in the interest of 
international peace and security “to facilitate Member States’ ability to contribute to 
operations.”230 Consequently, for PKOs authorized under Chapter VII, which is the case for the 
MONUSCO mission, the UN prohibits the ICC to prosecute crimes perpetrated by peacekeepers 
from TCCs not party to the ICC.231 Accordingly, 1422 (2002) reads that 
if a case arises involving current or former officials or personnel from a [TCC] not a 
Party to the Rome Statute over acts or omissions relating to a [PKO], shall for a twelve-
month period starting 1 July 2002 not commence or proceed with investigation or 
prosecution of any such case, unless the Security Council decides otherwise [emphasis 
added].
232
 
Similarly, in Resolution 1497 (2003) on the establishment of a multinational force in Liberia, 
authorized under Chapter VII, the SC recites the TCCs’ reservation on exclusive jurisdiction. Yet, 
it provides further for the possibility that such immunities can be “expressly waived” by the 
respective TCCs over officials and peacekeeping personnel for all crimes arising out of or are 
related to this operation.233 It follows that even military-peacekeepers from TCCs not party to the 
Rome Statute (e.g. India as a TCC to the MONUSCO military-contingent234) could be tried for 
grave breaches of IHL in the forum of the ICC, provided the TCC and the SC expressly allow for 
it. However, there does not appear to be evidence of such practice from TCCs, nor does it seem 
likely to materialize in the near future.  
 
Indeed, according to the ICRC not only the equal application, but also the equal  enforcement of 
IHL obligations is crucial for the integrity and credibility of the laws of war235 as protection from 
IHL to victims of armed conflict must be applied without adverse distinction.236 An exclusion of 
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individual responsibility of peacekeepers of grave breaches of IHL and for reparations would 
fundamentally weaken the purpose of the laws of armed conflict.237  
4.4. Conclusion of Part 4 
In the fourth part of this thesis, it was addressed whether the personnel of the Intervention 
Brigade, once obliged to follow IHL, can also be held accountable the breaches thereof. As the 
1999 Bulletin attributes exclusive jurisdiction to TCCs for their military-personnel’s violations of 
IHL, it appears that the same obstacles appear as if peacekeepers were prosecuted for crimes not 
related to the ongoing armed conflict. Consequently, the UN may merely exonerate criminals, but 
heavily relies upon TCCs’ cooperation to enforce accountability with IHL by bringing 
commissioners of international crimes to justice. South Africa’s practice has shown that it is 
practically possible to exercise trial close to the crime scene and compensate victims. As all three 
TCCs to the Intervention Brigade (South Africa, Malawi, Tanzania) are Signatories of the Rome 
Statute, the ICC may serve as a complementary forum in cases where the national prosecution of 
grave violations of IHL have proven inadequate. It follows that the complexity of the functioning 
of PKOs in general, highly dependent upon TCCs’ willingness to implement IHL standards into 
their military and criminal codes, according to which most military-personnel will be prosecuted 
for crimes commited while on mission. Further, practical obstacles of insufficient reporting and 
investigative mechanisms during volatile environments renders it difficult to hold peacekeepers 
accountable for crimes committed during their deployment in the host-country. 238  Indeed, it 
appears that initiatives to close the accountability gap for crimes committed by military-
peacekeepers must come from TCCs themselves, further ensuring the equality of belligerents also 
before the law, and granting equal access to justice to victims. Indeed, initiatives such as South 
Africa’s mobile court as well as the SC Resolution 2272 (2016) might be a step into the right 
direction.  
5. A FUTURE OUTLOOK FOR PEACEKEEPING 
Already with the establishment of the Intervention Brigade in 2013, the UN acknowledged the 
Intervention Brigade’s characteristics as unique to prior peacekeeping-practice 239 , repeatedly 
including in following MONUSCO mandates that the establishment of an offensive force is a sui 
generis and created “on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent or any prejudice to 
the agreed principles of peacekeeping”240. Indeed, MONUSCO’s robst capabilities have been 
regarded a success. South Africa has referred to the Intervention Brigade as “a credible example 
of success” as it confronted threats that were infringing the mission’s effectiveness, which is 
especially important.241  Indeed, in emphasising that non-military tools not always reflect the 
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capacity to ensure the operability of PKOs in high-threat environments, South Africa further 
welcomes robust mandates, furnished with sufficient resources and equipment, to realize 
obligations as the protection of civilians and deployed peacekeeping-personnel.242 It appears that 
a better preparedness and responsiveness to dangers and an increased mobility of missions is seen 
as a priority for contemporary peacekeeping.
 243 Special concern appears to be the protection of 
peacekeepers from becoming targets of direct attacks, as fatalities have risen in high-threat 
environments of deployment, as the  de Santos Cruz Report to the SG in 2017 reflects.244 The 
concern with the safety of contributed personnel is both, anchored as a customary norm, as well 
as a core precondition for the cooperation of TCCs. Overall, the de Santos Cruz Report draws 
attention to an increased number of peacekeeper-casualties that have resulted from lacking 
mobility, little deterrence capabilities, and unpreparedness of personnel resort to force when 
necessary 245 , thus welcoming an strengthened missions as a necessity for the  successful 
execution of mandates.  
Yet, concern has been voiced that peacekeeping, as a useful tool for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, might become increasingly confused with international military 
interventions, which in turn has the potential to threaten the legitimacy of PKOs as well as the 
UN as a whole.
 246 Indeed, the  contradictions of the Intervention Brigade’s mandate with the 
traditional principles of peacekeeping needs discussion regarding the UN’s future role in the 
execution of their mandates. 247  Yet, other PKOs have voiced the need for an improved 
responsiveness to threats in volatile environments, and consequently have reflected similar 
approaches to the Intervention Brigade in the DRC. An example is the Forces of the United 
Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) which has 
similarly been involved in military confrontations, under the authorization to deploy force for the 
deterrence of threats in Northern Mali.
 248 Following the establishment of MINUSMA’s mandate 
through SC Resolution 2100 (2012), Russia already then voiced its concern for a growing 
acceptance of authorized use of force in peacekeeping, stating that “what was once the exception 
now threatens to become unacknowledged standard practice, with unpredictable and unclear 
consequences.”249  
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Overall, the deployment of an offensive force in MONUSCO is widely regarded as necessary for 
the execution of the mission’s mandate, but also for the protection of UN personnel, in a volatile 
environment as the DRC. It appears as if states welcome the equipment of missions with more 
military capability and might resort to similar measures to strengthen PKOs equally in future. 
Indeed, states seem to widely acknowledge such development as adeqaute, a certain amount of 
scepticism is valid in light of uncertainties resulting from the increasing divergence from the 
traditional peacekeeping principles, neutrality, non-use of force, consent.  
FINAL CONCLUSION 
In light of an increased legitimization of the use of force during PKOs, this thesis primarily 
attempted to direct attention to the problems caused when peacekeepers become active in an area 
regulated by the laws of armed conflict. The Intervention Brigade, an offensive military force 
under the command of the MONUSCO mission in the DRC, was chosen as a specific case study 
as its is the first military-contingent under a PKO to fight alongside a government in neutralizing 
armed rebel groups. Witnessing a general development of increasingly robust peacekeeping-
mandates, this thesis is dedicated to the relevant contemplations as to whether IHL can be equally 
applicable, as well as equally enforceable, in situations where UN peacekeepers have been 
authorized to take up arms for offensive use of force.  
In essence, this thesis attempted to answer the research question whether peacekeepers of the 
Intervention Brigade in the MONUSCO mission are bound by international humanitarian 
law (IHL), and whether they can be held accountable for grave breaches thereof. Arriving at 
the end of this thesis, both elements to the question can be answered positively. Personnel of the 
Intervention Brigade are bound by IHL, at least for the time they actively engage in the ongoing 
hostilites. Further, members of the Intervention Brigade can, theoretically, be held accountable 
for grave breaches of IHL, however, the prosecution of violaters thereof is heavily reliant on 
TCCs’ willingness to exercise their exclusive jurisdiction in line with IHL standards. Before 
arriving at these conclusions, however, it was necessary to provide answers to several sub-issues. 
In analysing to what extent and which which rules of IHL are applicable in the conflict in the 
DRC, it was essential to identify the characteristic of the ongoing hostilities as either being of 
international or non-international nature. In doing so, it was established that neither the presence 
of the MONUSCO mission, nor are warring parties “effectively controlled” by neighboring states 
to qualify the conflict as an IAC. It follows that IHL applies to the Congolese armed forces, the 
FARDC, as well as to various rebel groups, provided they meet the criteria of sufficient 
organization and exercise the hostilities meeting the required treshhold of intensity. Consequently, 
it was established that the laws of NIACs must apply, which comprise, in essence, Common 
Article 3 of the GCs, Additional Protocol II, but also customary IHL rules. Those rules are 
enforced insofar as very serious violations of these norms have been prosecuted before the ICC, 
who is since 2014 authorized to exercise its jurisdiction regrad to crimes committed in relation 
with the respective conflict. Directing the attention back to peacekeeping, it was established that 
the UN has recognized that its personnel might become engaged in activities relevant to IHL. By 
investigating under what circumstances and to what extent UN peacekeepers can be bound by 
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IHL, the relevant 1994 Convention as well as the 1999 Bulletin provide answers, but also 
controveries valuable for futher analysis, as to whether they define with sufficient clarity the IHL 
applicability to the Intervention Brigade. 
Indeed, it was established that the Intervention Brigade qualifies as a party to the conflict, and 
thus must also abide by the rules applicable to the respective hostilities, at least for the time that 
they are actively engaged therein as combatants. This conclusion is additionally supported by the 
principle of equal application of the laws of armed conflict, which provides that belligerents, 
once party to a conflict, must be bound by IHL equally, regardless of any justification or 
legitimacy for their resort to force. However, it follows that the UN framework on the 
applicability of IHL to peacekeepers fails to specify several points, which would need further 
clarifications. Accordingly, it is unclear whether the protection provided for by the 1994 
Convention continues to apply throughout the Intervention Brigade’s engagement in the NIAC, 
as its limits its scope merely for military-peacekeepers who have become active in hostilities of 
international nature. As a result, it is unclear whether provided immunities and privileges, as well 
as the criminalization of the direct targeting of peacekeepers under this Convention, continue to 
exist throughout their engagement in a NIAC. Furthermore, the 1999 Bulletin provides a very 
narrow scope regarding peacekeepers’ obligation to abide by the laws of armed conflict, namely 
only for the specific “extent and for the duration” they are combatants. With respect to the 
Intervention Brigade under MONUSCO, this wording leaves room for interpretation as for which 
specific time frame MONUSCO’s military-contingents can be understood as exercising combat 
functions. Again, it follows that neither the mission’s mandate nor the UN Bulletin provide a 
clear answer to the question whether the entire MONUSCO mission or only the Intervention 
Brigade can be considered as a party to the conflict in the DRC. Overall, further specification on 
the temporary scope for the applicability of IHL to UN-forces would prove valuable, as it appears 
unclear whether the Intervention Brigade is considered as engaging in the respective hostilities 
throughout the entirety of their deployment, or merely for the specific time of the launching of a 
military operation. Such uncertainty poses not only a challenge to the respect for the laws of 
armed conflict, but directly endangered peacekeepers and their missions themselves, as they 
could be understood as belligerents in situations they are not. 
Having established that the Intervention Brigade, at least for the time acting as combatants, must 
abide by the GCs Common Article 3, AP II, as well as Customary IHL Rules, it was further 
analyzed whether its personnel can be held accountable for breaches thereof. As a result of the 
peacekeeping-system’s reliance on troop-contributions, practical and legal challenges are likely 
to arise for the adequate prosecution of peacekeepers who have committed grave breaches of IHL. 
It follows that the accountability of personnel heavily depends on the TCCs cooperation to 
implement and enforce IHL standards for the criminalization of grave breaches. As an example of 
a TCC to the Intervention Brigade, the practice of South Africa, having established a mobile-
military court in Kinshasa, reflects a good example of such cooperation. In the case a TCC proves 
unwilling or unable to prosecute military-personnel for grave breaches of IHL, peacekeepers can 
face international criminal accountability before the ICC. With regard to the Intervention Brigade, 
all TCCs (Malawi, South Africa, and Tanzania) are Signatories to the Rome Statute, and thus 
allow for the Court’s supplementary jurisdiction in the prosecution of war criminals. 
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The increased legitimacy allocated to the use of force under peacekeeping mandates has received 
both welcoming and sceptic responses. Overall, the UN and its TCCs acknowledge a growing 
need to sharpen PKOs threat-responsiveness in volatile environments, both for the successful 
execution of mandates as well as for the safety of peacekeeping-personnel. While such concerns 
justify the authorization of robust mandates, and as trends appear to continue into this direction, it 
is crucial that the UN clarifies its military-personnel’s status under IHL once they are mandated 
to become an active part in a conflict. In order to live up to its standards, the UN must urge its 
TCCs to “respect and ensure respect for [IHL]”, in terms of abidance by the applicable rules to a 
conflict, but also in the adequate prosecution when contingents have committed grave breaches of 
the laws of war. Furthermore, for the safety of a PKO as a whole, with an offensive force under 
its command, like the Intervention Brigade under MONUSCO, the UN should draw a visible line 
between peacekeepers authorized to become engaged in hostilities as combatants and 
peacekeepers who are, for the entirety of their deployment, entitled to the protection of civilians. 
If, however, the UN fails to do so while continuously allowing for the emerge of a new 
“aggressive” generation of peacekeeping, unpredictability and uncertainty for the equal 
application of the laws of war might await in the future.  
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ANNEX I: MAP OF MONUSCO, MAY 2015.  
 
 United Nations Department of Field Support, Available at 
http://img.static.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/styles/attachment-large/public/resources-
pdf-previews/351401-MONUSCO_May2015.png?itok=0DJUYdyL. Accessed May 17, 2018.   
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